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The Social Cost of Blackmail 
OLEG YEROKHIN
*
 
University of Wollongong 
Despite the fact that blackmail constitutes a voluntary transaction between two parties, it is deemed to be 
a criminal offense in most legal systems. The traditional economic approach to this so-called ‘paradox of 
blackmail’ emphasizes welfare loss generated by the costly rent-seeking activities of potential blackmailers 
as the primary justification for its criminalization. This argument, however, does not extend to cases in 
which potentially damaging information about the victim was acquired by the blackmailer at no cost. It 
also does not seem to shed light on a related puzzle: why is it legal for a potential victim to bribe the 
other party with the purpose of achieving the same final outcome (suppression of information) as in the 
case of blackmail? This paper addresses these questions in a simple model of bargaining under 
asymmetric information, which is used as a unified framework for studying both blackmail and bribery. 
Under asymmetric information the bargaining outcome is not efficient, regardless of the distribution of the 
bargaining power. However, when the blackmailer is a monopolist seller of the information, inefficiency 
results from his demands being too high relative to the social optimum, providing justification for the 
practice of penalizing blackmail. On the other hand, when a victim is the monopolist buyer of the 
information, the equilibrium offer is inefficiently low, implying that its punishment would be 
counterproductive. These arguments provide further support for the claim that under reasonable 
assumptions the criminalization of blackmail can be justified on efficiency grounds. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the standard definition, blackmail occurs when someone is 
threatened with a disclosure of potentially damaging information unless they 
agree to pay a monetary compensation to the threatening party. The “paradox of 
blackmail” refers to the fact that while both threatening to reveal information 
and asking for money are legal acts if performed separately, taken together they 
constitute a crime (Lindgren, 1984). This paradox raises a number of difficult 
questions which over the years have received considerable attention from legal 
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scholars.1 Katz and Lindgren (1993), for example, argue that “… one cannot think 
about coercion, contracts, consent, robbery, rape, unconstitutional conditions, 
nuclear deterrence, assumption of risk, the greater-includes-lesser arguments, 
plea bargains, settlements, sexual harassment, insider trading, bribery, 
domination, secrecy, privacy, law enforcement, utilitarianism and deontology 
without being tripped up repeatedly by the paradox of blackmail.” The 
criminalization of blackmail also seems to contradict the logic of economic 
efficiency. If the blackmailer has a legal right to reveal the information and the 
victim knows that the threat is credible, wouldn’t the victim be better off having 
an option of preventing the damage caused by the revelation at some cost?  
The traditional economic approach to the paradox of blackmail points out 
that in some cases it can be socially optimal to punish blackmail. In particular, 
Coase (1988) and Ginsburg and Shechtman (1993) argue that if blackmail were 
legal, large amounts of resources would be spent on collecting information 
about potential victims which would then be used to substantiate blackmailers’ 
demands. Alternatively, potential victims might choose to incur large costs by 
taking actions which would reduce their chances of being blackmailed. In both 
cases, the expenditure of real resources to redistribute, or prevent redistribution 
of, wealth from one individual to another would produce a net social loss. 
Therefore, prohibition of blackmail improves social welfare. Recently a 
comprehensive analysis of this argument in the context of a formal game-
theoretic model of the interaction between a blackmailer and a potential victim 
was provided by Gomez and Ganuza (2002). They show that criminalization of 
blackmail could be understood as a correction of the misaligned incentives to 
engage in rent-seeking behavior on the part of the blackmailer. 
However, an argument based on the assumption of costly information 
acquisition can offer only a partial solution to the paradox of blackmail. As 
pointed out by Lindgren (1989), the Ginsburg-Shechtman-Coase (GSC) theory 
of blackmail is not applicable when the blackmailer acquires information 
serendipitously and at no cost. Lindgren further substantiates this argument by 
drawing on the work of Hepworth (1975), who identified four different types of 
blackmail: participant blackmail, which occurs as a result of a prior relationship 
between the blackmailer and the victim; opportunistic blackmail, based on 
accidentally acquired information; commercial research blackmail, based on the 
information which was acquired on purpose; and entrepreneurial blackmail, in 
which the blackmailer himself creates a set of circumstances involving the 
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victim which are then used to substantiate blackmailers’ demands. Lindgren 
(1989) argues that the GSC theory of blackmail is incomplete because it cannot 
be applied to the cases of participant and opportunistic blackmail.  
Another common criticism of the rent-seeking argument for the 
criminalization of blackmail is that it seems to ignore the so-called paradox of 
bribery. As noted by DeLong (1993:1664), “it is not unlawful for one who knows 
another’s secret to accept an offer of payment made by an unthreatened victim 
in return for a potential blackmailer’s promise not to disclose the secret. What 
would otherwise be an unlawful blackmail exchange is a lawful sale of secrecy if 
it takes the form of a ‘bribe.’ Lawful bribery poses an obvious challenge to 
theories that are premised on either the wrongfulness or wastefulness of the 
blackmail exchange…” Thus, the identity of the party making the offer seems 
to be of crucial importance when determining whether a given negotiation 
constitutes a crime or is a form of lawful bargaining. 
This paper attempts to address the paradoxes of blackmail and bribery in a 
unified framework by drawing attention to the possible role of asymmetric 
information in justifying the criminalization of blackmail. It considers a 
situation in which the blackmailer obtains damaging information about a 
potential victim at no cost and decides whether to disclose it and receive a non-
negative payoff (market price of information) or to demand a payment from 
the victim for suppressing it. The disclosure of the information imposes a 
damage on the victim, whose willingness to pay to avoid this disclosure is not 
known by the blackmailer. The victim, on the other hand, might not know the 
market price of information faced by the blackmailer. Under these 
assumptions, both blackmail and bribery can be analyzed in the framework of 
bilateral trade under asymmetric information, a problem which has been 
extensively studied at least since Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). 
To emphasize the differences between blackmail and bribery, this paper 
studies two extreme allocations of bargaining power. The first one corresponds 
to the regime of legal blackmail, in which case the blackmailer is assumed to be 
able to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the potential victim. The second 
configuration corresponds to the situation in which blackmail is criminalized 
and the potential victim is the monopolist buyer of the information. It is 
further assumed that in both configurations the parties can enter into a legally 
enforceable contract for the non-disclosure of information. Under the regime 
of legal blackmail, the blackmailer performs an important role in screening 
victim types by offering them an opportunity to avoid the information 
disclosure if their damage is large enough compared to the market price. This 
might seem to imply that blackmail should not be punished. However, because 
in equilibrium the blackmailer’s demand is higher than the market price, 
 
 
information will be revealed too often compared to the social optimum. 
Therefore some form of regulatory remedy might be desirable. In particular, 
the optimal penalty would increase the cost of rejection to the blackmailer and 
induce him to lower his equilibrium demand. The opposite conclusion is 
reached under the assumption that all of the bargaining power lies with the 
potential victim. In this case the equilibrium offer is too low compared to the 
social optimum, implying that punishing bribery would be counterproductive. 
This simple argument provides a clear rationale for the distinct treatment of 
blackmail and bribery by legal codes, and shows that the criminalization of 
blackmail can be justified on efficiency grounds even in the absence of wasteful 
rent-seeking on the part of blackmailers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of 
blackmail and studies the welfare properties of the bargaining equilibrium. In 
section 3 the analysis of bribery is presented. Section 4 presents a discussion of 
the results and concluding remarks. 
2. BLACKMAIL 
Consider a hypothetical situation of a reporter who obtains a piece of 
information that is potentially damaging to a celebrity. This information could 
be sold to a newspaper at the market price, in which case the victim would 
suffer damage due to reputation loss, the magnitude of which is known only to 
the victim. On the other hand, the two parties could reach an agreement under 
which the celebrity would pay the reporter a sum of money in exchange for the 
promise of silence. The paper will focus on the properties of the equilibrium 
bargaining outcome assuming that both sides of the transaction are risk-neutral 
utility maximizers. The approach taken here is similar to the framework used in 
the study of pre-trial negotiations with asymmetric information (Bebchuk, 1984; 
Nalebuff, 1987; Daughety and Reinganum, 1994), which typically rely on the ultimatum 
game setup in which one party has private information about the damage it 
would suffer in case no agreement is reached.2 The next section develops the 
main argument in favor of punishing blackmail under the assumption that the 
market price of information reflects its full social value. The subsequent section 
discusses how the relaxation of this assumption would affect the main 
qualitative results. 
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2.1. A MODEL OF BLACKMAIL   
Let 0≥p  denote the market price of the information, and let L  be the damage 
suffered by the victim if the information is revealed. The potential victim of the 
blackmail knows the value of L  with certainty, while the blackmailer’s beliefs 
about L  are summarized by the cumulative distribution function )(⋅F , which is 
assumed to be continuously differentiable and log-concave.3 Because the social 
value of the information disclosure is equal to p L− , an efficient outcome 
involves the disclosure of the information when p L≥ , while non-disclosure is 
optimal if p L< . If there were no blackmailer, the celebrity would have an 
incentive to disclose the information if and only if p L≥ , and the outcome 
would be efficient. The presence of the blackmailer who does not bear the cost 
of information disclosure creates a negative externality and the two parties might 
try to reach a mutually beneficial agreement through the bargaining process. In 
this section it is shown that even though those victims who would suffer a 
relatively large loss if information were revealed are better off because of 
blackmail, the equilibrium of the bargaining game in which the blackmailer 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the victim is not always efficient. Intuitively, 
efficiency requires that information is disclosed only if the damage to the victim 
is lower than the market price (which is assumed to reflect the value of the 
information to the rest of society). Under asymmetric information this condition 
will not be satisfied because the blackmailer will demand a payment which 
exceeds the market price. As a result, a penalty which induces the blackmailer to 
lower his demand will increase social welfare. 
Consider the case of blackmail as a legally enforceable contract under which 
the victim agrees to pay the blackmailer a sum of money in exchange for the 
guarantee that information will not be revealed.4 Suppose further that the 
blackmailer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer by demanding x  dollars from 
the victim in exchange for the promise not to reveal the information. The 
victim will agree to pay x  to the blackmailer only if the demand is lower than 
the damage suffered if the information is revealed, that is if Lx ≤ . The 
blackmailer’s demand thus will be rejected with probability ( )F x , implying 
that his expected profit is given by: 
xxFxpFxR ))(1()()( −+= .      (1) 
                                                 
3 Log-concavity is a standard regularity condition which is satisfied by most commonly used 
probability distributions (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 2005). 
4 Note that this assumption implies that the blackmailer can credibly commit to making a take-
it-or-leave-it offer.  
 
 
The optimal payment demand ∗x  must satisfy the first-order condition for the 
maximization of the expected profit in Equation (1), which is given by: 
0)(1)()()( =−+′−=′ ∗∗∗∗ xFxFxpxR .    (2) 
The log-concavity of )(⋅F  implies that )1/( FF −′  is an increasing function. In 
other words, we must have 0)())(1)(( 2 >′+−′′ xFxFxF . The second derivative 
of the expected profit function is given by 
( )2
( ) ( )( ) 2 ( )
1
( )(1 ( )) 2 ( ) 0
( )
R x F x p x F x
F x F x F x
F x
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
∗
′′ ′′ ′= − − =
′′ ′− − + <
′
   (3) 
where the second equality was obtained by using (2) to solve for *p x− and 
substituting the resulting expression in (3). Therefore, the assumption of 
log-concavity implies that the second-order condition for profit 
maximization is satisfied.  
To show that the blackmailer’s optimal demand ∗x  always results in a 
deadweight loss, note that (2) implies that 0)(1)( >−=′ pFpR . Because 
0)( =′ ∗xR , and from (3) we know that )(⋅′R  is a decreasing function, we 
conclude that *x p> , i.e. equilibrium demand always exceeds market price. 
This result is not surprising since the market price constitutes the disagreement 
payoff of the blackmailer in this bargaining game. Consider now the following 
three cases which enumerate possible relationships between market price, 
damage suffered by the victim, and the blackmailer’s optimal demand.  
(i) *L p x≤ < . In this case the blackmailer’s demand will be rejected and 
the information will be disclosed. This is an efficient outcome because 
the victim’s damage is lower than the market price of the information. 
Note that in this case, the victim also has an incentive to disclose the 
information himself. 
(ii) *p x L< ≤ . In this case the victim will agree to pay *x  and sign a 
non-disclosure contract with the blackmailer. This is an efficient 
outcome because L p> . 
(iii) *p L x< < . In this case the victim will refuse to pay and the 
information will be disclosed, which results in a deadweight loss because 
the social value of the information disclosure, p L− , is negative.  
 
 
The equilibrium corresponding to Case (iii) and the range of victim types 
which result in a deadweight loss are illustrated in Figure 1. The expected 
deadweight loss in this case is given by 
*
( ) ( )
x
p
s p dF s−∫ . 
*
x L
p
p
o
45
DWL
0
 
Figure 1.  Deadweight Loss from Blackmail 
 
The fact that the equilibrium of the bargaining game is inefficient from the 
social point of view when the victim’s type falls in the interval ),( *xp  provides 
a justification for the criminalization of blackmail. Note, however, that the 
outright prohibition of blackmail does not by itself improve efficiency: in the 
absence of bargaining between the blackmailer and the potential victim, 
information will be revealed in all of the three cases above. This will result in a 
net loss in Cases (ii) and (iii). In this model, therefore, blackmail could be 
welfare-enhancing as long as the payment demanded is not too high compared 
to the market price of the information, allowing most of the “high damage” 
types (those with pL> ) to avoid disclosure. 
To improve on the equilibrium outcome, government or social planners can 
impose a punishment for blackmail which would decrease the blackmailer’s 
optimal demand. For example, consider a version of the above bargaining game 
in which the victim either accommodates the blackmailer’s demand or, if the 
demand exceeds the damage, rejects it and simultaneously reports the blackmail 
to the authorities. In this case, a non-disclosure agreement can no longer take the 
 
 
form of a legally enforceable contract. However, it is reasonable to expect that 
the blackmail agreement can still be achieved as an equilibrium outcome of the 
interaction between the blackmailer and the victim when the blackmail is a 
criminal offense. Indeed, if the blackmailer reneges on his promise and reveals 
information after being paid by the victim, the latter can always report the case of 
blackmail to the authorities ex post. The possibility of this outcome would 
provide the blackmailer with a sufficient incentive to stick to his part of the deal. 
Alternatively, as pointed out by Gomez and Ganuza (2002), there might be other 
ways for the blackmailer to regain his commitment power even if the victim has 
no incentive to report the blackmail ex post. In particular, these authors provide 
several scenarios in which commitment arises endogenously due to the 
reputation effects or repeated nature of the relationship between the blackmailer 
and the victim when blackmail is not subject to legal regulation.  
As an example of a possible incentive scheme in the criminal blackmail 
regime, consider the case in which the blackmailer is liable to pay a monetary 
penalty equal to 0t >  if the blackmail is reported to the authorities. The 
purpose of this penalty is not to make blackmail prohibitively costly, but to 
change the blackmailer’s behavior at the margin in order to reduce the 
deadweight loss. The assumption that punishment for blackmail takes the form 
of a fine is made for analytical convenience. In principle, t  is meant to 
represent the dollar value of all costs (including jail time, if any) imposed on a 
person found guilty of blackmail. Under this assumption the blackmailer’s 
objective function is then given by  
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))R x p t F x F x x= − + − .    (4) 
This form of punishment thus simply reduces the blackmailer’s payoff in case 
his demand is rejected by the victim. The first order condition then becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0R x p t x F x F x
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗′ ′= − − + − = .   (5) 
In this case the optimal demand *( )x t  will be a function of the penalty for 
blackmail. Note that (4) and (5) taken together imply that 
2
2
( )
0
( )(1 ( )) 2 ( )
x F x
t F x F x F x
∗ ∗′∂
= − <
′′ ′∂ − +
 .   (6) 
The optimal value of the penalty would solve the problem of minimizing the 
deadweight loss resulting from blackmail subject to the incentive 
compatibility constraint, which ensures that the blackmailer would prefer to 
 
 
screen victim types by engaging in the bargaining process as opposed to 
simply selling information on the market. That is, the optimal blackmail 
penalty t̂  must minimize 
*
( )
( ) ( )
x t
p
s p dF s−∫ , subject to the constraint 
* * *
( ) ( ( )) [1 ( ( ))] ( )p t F x t F x t x t p− + − ≥ . Because the incentive compatibility 
constraint implies that * ˆ( )x t p> , when the penalty is set at the optimal level 
equilibrium demand will be given by * *
0
ˆ( ) ( , )x t p x∈ , where * *0 ( 0)x x t= = . 
While in general the regulatory remedy against blackmail need not take this 
particular form, it is clear from the discussion above that in this model some 
form of punishment for blackmail will be welfare-enhancing despite the 
assumption of costless information acquisition. 
2.2. SOCIAL VALUE OF INFORMATION AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
BLACKMAIL 
The main qualitative results presented in the previous section were obtained 
under the assumption that the market price of information p  coincides with 
the social value of information disclosure, which implies that revelation is 
efficient when net social surplus p L−  is positive. Under this assumption, 
bargaining under symmetric information always results in a Pareto efficient 
outcome and inefficiency of blackmail arises due to the absence of trade under 
asymmetric information when the victim’s type falls in the interval 
*
( , )p x . 
Because it is possible that the blackmailer will not capture the full social surplus 
from information disclosure, it is important to study how this assumption 
affects the main conclusions obtained in the previous section. To this end, let 
V denote the social value of the information, which is assumed to exceed the 
blackmailer’s payoff (V p> ). In this case revelation is socially efficient if and 
only if 0V L− > . We have to consider the following cases:  
(i) *V x< . Because bargaining results in information disclosure when 
*
L x< , information revelation will be inefficient when *V L x< < . On 
the other hand, information is suppressed when *V x L< < , which is 
an efficient outcome. Therefore in this case the main qualitative 
conclusion from the previous section remains valid: blackmail can result 
in inefficient disclosure of information, and this inefficiency can be 
alleviated by punishing blackmail on the margin. 
(ii) *x V< . In this case disclosure, which occurs in equilibrium when 
*
L x< , is always efficient. If information is not disclosed ( *x L< ) then 
 
 
the outcome is inefficient when *x L V< < . In this case the 
blackmailer’s demand is too low from the social point of view. On the 
other hand, the bargaining outcome is efficient when *x V L< < . 
The overall conclusion emerging from the preceding discussion is that 
divergence between the blackmailer’s private payoff and the social value of 
information disclosure would change the conclusions reached in the previous 
section when the social value of information is much higher than the market 
price and also exceeds the blackmailer’s optimal demand and the victim’s 
damage ( *p x L V< < < ). In this case a social planner would not want to 
diminish the blackmailer’s demand on the margin (as described in section 2.1), 
but simply to prohibit blackmail altogether.  
Because the qualitative results of the previous section are overturned when 
the social value of information is much larger than the market price, one might 
be interested in considering the types of situations in which this condition is 
likely to occur. The most prominent example is perhaps the case of 
information about a criminal offense committed by the potential target of the 
blackmailer’s demands, when the society is likely to place a much higher value 
on information revelation than a blackmailer would. One way to restore 
efficiency in this case would be to prohibit blackmail (by imposing a 
sufficiently large penalty) only when information relates to a crime. This 
however would require the blackmailer to be able to infer whether the case at 
hand is a criminal offense or not and proceed accordingly, which might not 
always be an easy task. A viable alternative to the complete prohibition of 
blackmail would be for the social planner to signal the social value of 
information by providing sufficient incentives for the informed party to reveal 
it. If these incentives are set at an appropriate level the outcome will be 
efficient. Examples of such incentives include monetary rewards for providing 
information about a criminal act or the social status and recognition obtained 
by whistleblowers who reveal socially valuable information. More generally one 
would expect that in cases when the social value of information is particularly 
large the society would come up with an appropriate incentive scheme to ensure 
an efficient outcome. It is the criminalization of bargaining agreements which do 
not impose large external costs on other members of society which makes the 
criminalization of blackmail paradoxical, and which is the main focus of the 
argument for punishing blackmail developed in the previous section.  
 
 
3. BRIBERY 
Having demonstrated the rationale for criminalization of blackmail, we will 
show now that similar reasoning can be applied to the bribery paradox. To 
emphasize the differences between blackmail and bribery, we study an 
ultimatum game in which the potential victim can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
to the other party to enter into a legally binding nondisclosure agreement in 
exchange for monetary compensation. Thus, in the bribery game the distribution 
of bargaining power is reversed as compared to the case of blackmail. In general 
the victim might or might not know the price at which the blackmailer can sell 
information to other parties. For this reason, most of the analysis is conducted 
under the assumption of asymmetric information. Section 3.2 provides a brief 
discussion of the case in which the potential victim is fully informed. 
3.1. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT MARKET PRICE 
Let L  denote the victim’s damage from disclosure and suppose the victim’s 
beliefs about the market price p  are summarized by the cumulative 
distribution function )(⋅H , which is assumed to be continuously differentiable 
and log-concave. The victim will choose the bribe level y  to minimize the 
expected loss which is given by  
yyHyHLyD )())(1()( +−= .     (7) 
That is, the victim’s offer will be accepted only if it exceeds the market price of 
information and will be rejected otherwise, in which case the victim will suffer 
a damage L . 
The optimal bribe level must satisfy 
0)()()()(
**** =+′−=′ yHyHLyyD .    (8) 
Note that the second order condition for the minimization problem can be 
written as 
 * * * 2
*
1
( ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ) 0
( )
H y H y H y
H y
′′ ′− + >
′
.   (9) 
By log-concavity of )(⋅H  the term in parenthesis is negative, which implies 
that the second order condition is satisfied. The structure of the victim’s 
decision problem implies that the optimal bribe level can never exceed the 
actual damage, i.e. it must be the case that LLy <)(* . This intuition is verified 
 
 
by noting that 0)()( >=′ LHLD  and that )(⋅′D  is an increasing function. 
As in the case of blackmail, the equilibrium in this game is not efficient. The 
inefficiency in this game stems from the fact that a victim with damage above 
market price might find it optimal to offer a bribe which is lower than the price 
and get rejected. However, it is easy to see that punishing bribery will not be 
welfare-enhancing. Consider the following three cases. 
(i) *( )p y L L< < . In this case the offer will be accepted and no 
information will be revealed, which is an efficient outcome because 
Lp < .  
(ii) *( )p L y L> > . In this case the offer will be rejected and information 
will be revealed, which is also efficient.  
(iii) LpLy <<)(* . In this case the offer will be rejected and 
information will be revealed, resulting in a deadweight loss. 
The inefficiency arises in case (iii) because the bribe level is too small compared 
to the actual damage. In particular, the deadweight loss is increasing in the 
distance between )(* Ly  and L , implying that punishing bribery would be 
counterproductive.  
3.2. PUBLICLY KNOWN MARKET PRICE 
It might be interesting to consider the case in which the market value of 
information is known to the victim with certainty, while the damage from 
disclosure remains their private information. The plausibility of this 
assumption will vary from case to case but it is easy to imagine a situation in 
which it might be valid. For example, a celebrity at risk of exposure might have 
a good idea about the price that tabloids would pay for given information. 
With this additional assumption, the nature of equilibrium will depend on the 
social value of information disclosure, p L− . In particular, if L p< , then both 
the blackmailer and the victim would have an incentive to disclose the 
information, and the equilibrium is socially efficient. Conversely, if L p> , 
then in the bribery game the victim can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
( , )x p L∈  which will be accepted and the information will not be disclosed. 
Therefore when the party affected negatively by the disclosure has the 
bargaining power and is fully informed about the market price, the bargaining 
outcome will always be efficient. In this, admittedly, special case the difference 
between blackmail and bribery becomes much sharper: a legal system that 
 
 
prohibits blackmail and simultaneously allows bribery constitutes the most 
efficient arrangement from the society’s point of view.  
The efficiency of bribery when the market price is known by the victim is an 
example of a well-known result from the literature on bilateral trade with 
asymmetric information. When a seller with publicly known costs engages in 
bargaining with a buyer whose value of the object is not known to the seller, an 
arrangement in which the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer would 
maximize social welfare. Once the analysis of the case of publicly known price is 
rephrased in terms of a bilateral bargaining setup, the answer to the question of 
what is the most efficient allocation of bargaining power between blackmailer 
and victim becomes apparent. Thus the main point of this subsection is not to 
re-iterate this well-known fact, but simply to point out that it could be fruitfully 
applied in the analysis of the blackmail and bribery puzzles.  
An important caveat that must be kept in mind here is that this argument can, 
in principle, go both ways. In particular, if the victim’s damage but not the 
market price is publicly known, efficiency would require allocating all of the 
bargaining power to the blackmailer. This information structure, however, is 
not very likely to occur in practice: because the full damage will include 
monetary as well as psychic components, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the amount of damage inflicted on the victim is his private information. The 
market price, on the other hand, could be learned by any interested party, 
including the potential victim. For these reasons we feel that the emphasis of 
this paper on the assumption of private (as opposed to public) information 
about the victim’s damage is justified.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper the puzzles of blackmail and bribery were addressed in a unified 
framework of a stylized bargaining game with asymmetric information. In 
contrast to previous approaches to the problem of blackmail, we do not 
assume the blackmailer has to incur real costs to acquire information about the 
potential victim. In this simple setup, the presence of asymmetric information 
implies that punishing blackmail but not bribery will improve social welfare. In 
particular, because the blackmailer does not bear the cost from the revelation 
of information, his equilibrium demand will be too high relative to the social 
optimum and some form of regulatory remedy might be appropriate. On the 
other hand, the equilibrium bribe offered by the potential victim always lies 
below the socially optimal level, implying that punishing bribery would be 
counterproductive. The solution to the blackmail and bribery puzzles proposed 
in this paper is complementary and distinct from the existing theory of 
 
 
blackmail developed by Coase (1988), Ginsburg and Shechtman (1993) and 
extended by Gomez and Ganuza (2002). 
There are several extensions of the model which could further improve our 
understanding of the paradoxes of blackmail and bribery. First, the assumption 
of a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining structure could be relaxed by considering an 
infinite horizon game in which in each period the blackmailer decides whether 
to reveal information or to come up with a lower demand, conditional on the 
previous demand being rejected. A problem of this kind was considered by 
Fudenberg et al. (1987), who studied a model in which an incompletely 
informed seller has an outside opportunity of selling a good to another party. 
They found that the presence of an outside option resulted in the existence of 
multiple equilibria, which poses additional challenges to a welfare analysis.  
A related issue that might be addressed is repeated blackmail, i.e. a situation in 
which the blackmailer keeps coming back with new demands over time. In this 
paper the possibility of repeated blackmail was ruled out by the assumption 
that the parties can enter into a legally binding non-disclosure agreement. In 
the absence of this type of contracting, the durability of information makes the 
blackmailer’s problem similar to the problem faced by the monopolist selling a 
durable good (Coase, 1972). In this case even high damage victim types will lack 
an incentive to comply with the blackmailer’s demands if they expect to be 
blackmailed again in the future. A dynamic model of bargaining between the 
blackmailer and the victim could be used to understand how blackmail can take 
place in the absence of credible commitment mechanisms and how a lack of 
commitment might affect the rationale for the criminalization of blackmail. 
Finally, an interesting extension of the model would be to consider a setup in 
which the bargaining power is shared among the two parties. As argued in 
section 3, when the market price of information (or alternatively, the 
blackmailer’s payoff from revealing it) is known to both parties, it is socially 
efficient to allocate all the bargaining power to the potential victim. However, 
when only the blackmailer knows his payoff from information revelation, the 
question of a welfare-maximizing allocation of bargaining power becomes a non-
trivial one. As an alternative to the simple ultimatum bargaining assumption, one 
could adopt a mechanism design approach in the spirit of Myerson and 
Satterthwaite (1983). In this setting an efficient outcome cannot be guaranteed 
under any mechanism, but it still might be of interest to consider the effects of 
criminal and legal blackmail regimes. These extensions are left for future research. 
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